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Abstract. The last quarter-century bore witness to a sea change in academic involve-
ment with commerce. Widespread university-based efforts to identify, manage, and
market intellectual property (IP) have accompanied broad shifts in the relationship
between academic and proprietary approaches to the dissemination and use of science
and engineering research. Such transformations are indicators of institutional changes
at work in the environment faced by universities. This paper draws upon a fifteen-year
panel (1981–1995) of university-level data for 87 research-intensive US campuses in
order to document trends and transitions in relationships among multiple indicators of
academic and commercial engagement. The institutional environment for public and
private science is volatile, shifting in fits and starts from a situation conducive to
organizational learning through high volume patenting to a more challenging
arrangement that links indiscriminate pursuit of IP with declines in both the volume and
impact of academic science. The pattern and timing of these transitions may support an
enduring system of stratification that offers increasing returns to first-movers while
limiting the opportunities available to universities that are later entrants to the com-
mercial realm. Unpacking the systematic effects of university research commercializa-
tion requires focused attention on the sources and trajectories of profound institutional
change.
Keywords: Institutional change, organizational environment, university, partly of
license, research communication.
Introduction
The last quarter century has witnessed a dramatic expansion in the
intensity and variety of university–industry relations. Far from
remaining ‘upstream’ contributors of basic research, expertise, instru-
mentation, and training, universities are forging increasingly tight
connections to industry through mechanisms as diverse as patenting and
licensing, incubator development, equity ownership in start-up corpo-
rations, and even active venture capital investment (Association of
University Techology Managers 2000; Desruisseaux 2000). These
changes were catalyzed by federal and state level policies (Lee 1994;
Slaughter and Rhoades 1996) and increasingly close intellectual and
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organizational connections linking cutting edge basic science to com-
mercially valuable research in the life sciences (Owen-Smith et al. 2002;
Powell and Owen-Smith 2002). Such shifts expanded through the
institutionalization of organizational infrastructures for technology
transfer on research intensive US campuses (Neuer 1995; Sampat and
Nelson 1999).
Changes associated with academic research commercialization have
been characterized as ‘revolutionary’ (Etzkowitz et al. 1998) and as
components of the broader social ‘shockwave’ that stands to transform
the academy and its place in society (Kerr 2002). But these alterations
are not all of a piece and they do not emerge in isolation. Instead, I
contend, they are outcomes of an ongoing process of institutional and
organizational transformation in the arrangements and practices of
universities and academic science. Such transformations are periodized,
history dependent, and occur at multiple levels of analysis.
On this view, the broad effects of academic research commerciali-
zation can be found in the academy’s changing position relative to
government and industry (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 1998; Gibbons
et al. 1994; Owen-Smith et al. 2002) and in transformations in the status
orders and rules that govern inter-university competition (Kleinman
and Vallas 2001; Owen-Smith 2003). On campus, such alterations
register effects on scientific practice ‘at the bench’ by altering the cal-
culus scientists use to select problems (Kleinman 1998), increasing se-
crecy and limiting access to research tools (Campbell et al. 2000; Heller
and Eisenberg 1998), shifting standards for judging the credibility and
importance of findings (Merton 1988; Packer and Webster 1996), and
transforming the meanings scientists and engineers attribute to their
work and careers (Etzkowitz 2003; Owen-Smith and Powell 2001a,
2001b).
In what follows I sketch the contours of academic research com-
mercialization to argue that these changes accompany shifts in the
broad relationship between public and commercial science. Changing
relationships between academic and pecuniary research outputs repre-
sent an instance of macro-institutional change. I then turn to an
inductive and descriptive, but quantitative, analysis of trends and
transformations in the institutional environment faced by universities as
they struggle to reconcile the distinct but increasingly interpellated
logics of public and proprietary science. Drawing on patenting and
publication data for a 15 year (1981–1995) panel of 87 research-inten-
sive universities, I use residual correlations to examine shifting rela-
tionships between public and private science. I conclude by considering
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the implications such transformations have for theories of institutional
change and for the commercial and academic endeavors of universities.
Commercialization and the changing institutional environment for science
While the origins of academic research commercialization are far flung
(Geiger 1993; Mansfield 1991; Mansfield and Lee 1996; Rosenberg and
Nelson 1994), an important federal policy change – the 1980 Bayh–Dole
act – catalyzed widespread transformations in academic involvement
with commerce.1 Bayh–Dole was intended to increase national tech-
nological and economic competitiveness by enabling non-profit orga-
nizations (including universities) and small businesses to patent the
outcomes of federally funded research and development.
Under the rules set by the 1980 act, intellectual property (IP)
developed on campus with federal funding must be owned by the uni-
versity and transferred to the market. While many campuses were
deeply involved in commerce prior to Bayh–Dole,2 the act standardized
rules for university technology transfer, dramatically increased univer-
sity patenting and licensing efforts, and accelerated the diffusion of
organizational arrangements for the identification, management and
marketing of intellectual property on campus. In organizational and
institutional terms, Bayh–Dole’s net result was that research intensive
universities moved, en masse, into a new competitive arena character-
ized by commercial outputs that they were traditionally ill-equipped to
manage. This move necessitated transformations in the organizational
and institutional arrangements that support science and engineering
research on campus (Owen-Smith 2003).
The commodification of university science has also spawned a cot-
tage industry of academic investigation. Despite diverse disciplinary
origins and methodological approaches,3 however, scholars interested in
the causes and consequences of university research commercialization
generally conceive of academic and commercial science as institutionally
distinct fields of endeavor (Dasgupta and David 1987, 1994). The logics
and rules associated with these regimes are characterized primarily in
terms of the outputs of science and engineering. Patents, the coin of the
commercial realm, and publications, the gold standard for the academy,
are importantly different. Those distinctions are nicely captured by
Rip’s (1986) analogy linking patents to fences and publications to
funnels. Patents, which draw on legal and bureaucratic standards of
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validation, are fences in the sense that they offer limited monopoly
rights to the ‘plot’ of knowledge their claims demarcate. In contrast,
publication funnels are typically validated through peer review pro-
cesses, place findings in the public domain, and are successful precisely
to the extent that they are used by others. Where the efficacy of a patent
depends on its owners’ ability to police their property, publications
have – and to be successful can have – no expectation of exclusivity.
In this view, the primary distinction between academic and com-
mercial science lies not in the details off daily practice but in standards
of credibility, valuation, and meaning associated with different mecha-
nisms for the dissemination and use of findings. ‘‘[W]hat matters is the
socio-economic rule structures under which the research takes place,
and, most importantly, what the researchers do with their findings’’
(Dasgupta and David 1994, p. 95). In this sense, the rationalized system
of rules, conventions, and taken-for-granted assumptions embedded in
intellectual property law and the peer review process represent two
distinctive (and potentially contradictory) institutional models for the
organization and conduct of scientific and engineering research efforts
(Dimaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977). More to the
point, the university and its research mission have traditionally been
inseparable from academic reward systems and information disclosure
conventions. Despite academe’s contributions to commercial develop-
ment and important reciprocal flows from industry (Mansfield and Lee
1996; Rosenberg 2000), strict separation of the institutions of academic
and commercial research have made it extremely difficult, until very
recently, to coherently describe the features of an ‘entrepreneurial’
university (but see Clark 1998).
Yet universities increasingly appear entrepreneurial in their pursuit
and use of intellectual property. Commercial efforts on the part of
quintessentially academic organizations may not prove broadly corro-
sive to non-proprietary pursuits (Mowery et al. 2001; Powell and Owen-
Smith 1998).4 Indeed, evidence at varied levels of analysis suggests that
in some fields academic and commercial arrangements are converging
on university campuses (Hicks et al. 2001; Kleinman and Vallas 2001;
Owen-Smith 2003). In essence, the entrepreneurial university heralds a
wider change in the institutional environments that govern research and
development efforts generally as potentially contradictory and individ-
ually durable institutional systems are collapsed into a single organi-
zational mission.
Such a collapse, I contend, offers the opportunity to observe dra-
matic changes in an institutional environment as established orders are
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disrupted and novel tensions – that lack taken for granted resolutions –
are introduced when otherwise coherent and stable arrangements are
brought into prolonged contact. Such ‘multiplicity’ effects result in
profound change precisely because long dominant and organizationally
reified rule sets can lose their appearance of inevitability when applied
to the same objects and contexts (Clemens and Cook 1999; Sewell 1992;
Stinchcombe 1978).5 In this setting, the changing relationships among
outcomes that exemplify the characteristic features of public and
pecuniary science are analogous to the interstitial spaces that serve as a
breeding ground for social novelty (Morrill 2004). Thus capturing the
empirical shifts in relationships of convergence, independence, and
substitution across academic publishing and patenting efforts can shed
light upon larger patterns of institutional change. Such linkages also
illumine some of the perils and possibilities of research commerciali-
zation by demonstrating the contingent effects of university patenting
and publishing in light of prior activities on campus.
Whether bullish or bearish, scholars and pundits situate both the
benefits and the detriments of academic research commercialization at
the intersection of these distinct arrangements. Profound changes
associated with commodification can be located at the inter-organiza-
tional level in shifting relationships among the inputs (particularly R&D
funding) and the outputs (particularly academic publications and pat-
ents) of university science. Thus conceptualized, larger transformations
in the relationship between public and private science stand to alter both
arrangements on campus and the broader environment in which uni-
versities compete for students, faculty, prestige, research support, and
increasingly the rights to commercially valuable technologies.
In what follows I trace secular trends in the relationships between
academic and proprietary uses of scientific findings using residual cor-
relations.6 Changing relationships between public and private science
might manifest empirically in three ways. Consider the following
alternatives: (1) universities might engage in commercial activities while
maintaining strict – though perhaps symbolic – segregation between
academic and proprietary trajectories.7 Strong separation between up-
stream or ‘basic’ academic science and downstream or ‘applied’ pro-
prietary science has provided a core organizing principle for science
policy and research funding since the end of World War II (Kleinman
1995). If they remain active, such distinctions will manifest in the rel-
ative independence of commercial and academic regimes and hence of
patent and publication outputs.
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On a field shaped more clearly by academic organizations’ movement
into the proprietary realm, (2) universities’ commercial endeavors might
be integrated in a more fundamental way with the pursuit of academic
goals. This scenario suggests an outcome other than independence. If
the relationship between public and proprietary science is corrosive to
the values and practices of the academy, then patents and publications
will be negatively related. If, on the other hand, commercial and aca-
demic science represent (or come to represent) mutually reinforcing
regimes – as is increasingly the case in biomedicine – then patents and
papers will be positively related.
Shifting relationships between public and private science outcomes
reflect a changing field of play for inter-university competition. If such
transitions are largely exogenous to the activities of universities – as
would be the case if federal policy initiatives such as Bayh–Dole effec-
tively generated academic research commercialization instead of accel-
erating it – then academic institutions will confront their changing
environments in much the same fashion as athletes confront inclement
weather. All players on the field will be affected in approximately the
same way by factors beyond their control that necessitate adaptations in
their efforts. Alternatively, change may emerge from structured patterns
of action by core organizations. Here university attempts to reconcile
tensions raised at the intersection of public and private science will drive
changes at the level of the institutional environment. This image evokes
a playing field that is progressively transformed by the strategies and
efforts of players. The directions such tilts take are open to empirical
scrutiny, but consider one possibility. If strategies pursued by the ear-
liest entrants to a field exert more influence on playing conditions than
the efforts of newcomers, then the playing surface will be shaped to
favor incumbents, enforcing increasing returns that will be difficult for
later entrants to overcome.
The alternative trajectories sketched above represent independent,
substitution (negative) and complementary (positive) associations. To
date these relationships have been examined using methods that
estimate direct and reciprocal effects across key commercial and aca-
demic indicators.8 Such strategies typically rely on a limited set of
regression coefficients for empirical support and thus face important
methodological constraints on the number of and type of relationships
they examine. In the interests of specifying identifiable models and
controlling for unexplained variation, these approaches may miss
broader shifts occurring among large sets of indicators, thus sacrificing
a sense of global shifts in order to specify important correlates of
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success. I reverse the typical approach in order to establish shifting
trends and timing in the institutional environment faced by research-
intensive universities. Residual correlations raise interesting methodo-
logical challenges and sacrifice clear signals about the correlates of
university success in favor of a wide-angle view of change.
Data and methods
Shifting relationships between public and private science accompany
increased university commercialization, altering academic status com-
petitions and mobility patterns (Owen-Smith 2003). In other words,
changes that emerge from closer contact between academic and com-
mercial science alter both the rules of the game and the environmental
conditions for university competition. In order to capture the broad
features of these transformations I conceptualize the institutional
environment faced by universities in terms of four variables that indi-
cate the volume and impact of academic publications and patents.
Table l summarizes these variables and presents descriptive statistics
and simple correlations for the full sample of 87 ‘Research 1’ univer-
sities.9
Number of patents, a measure drawn from United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) database searches, captures the volume of
intellectual property development on campus.10 The first row of
descriptive statistics in Table 1, indicates a mean of slightly more than
12 patents per year for these universities, a figure that masks broad
dispersion and a wide range. The last year of this panel (1995) is the first
year in which all of the 87 universities received at least one patent. In
that same year the University of California campuses at Berkeley and
San Francisco successfully applied for 250 patents.11
Wide variation in the volume of commercial science conducted on
campus is matched by gulfs of impact. I use forward citations (citations
from subsequent patents to a focal patent) as a measure of the impact of
a university’s IP. The patent citation measure, which was extracted from
the National Bureau of Economic Research Patent Citation Database
(Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2002), is standardized by year and technological
class. Thus, a patent impact score of 1 indicates a piece of IP that was
cited exactly the mean number of times as other patents of its year and
technological class. The mean for the full sample of universities on this
measure is 1.15, suggesting that the patents issued to these universities
are cited slightly more than the average, but that statistic also masks

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































wide variation with many university patents receiving no citations and
some receiving citations many standard deviations above the mean.
The two measures of academic outputs are drawn from the Institute
for Scientific Information’s (ISI) university indicators database. Num-
ber of papers simply measures the volume of academic science and
engineering articles produced on campus. The mean is slightly more
than 1600 articles with a range from 201 at the low end to more than
8100 at the high end. Paper impact is a measure of citations by sub-
sequent articles. It too is standardized and so that the mean impact of
1.52 for the full sample represents papers cited slightly more than 50%
as often as the mean for their year and field.
Turn your attention to the correlation table presented in Table 1.
The outlined portion of the matrix represents the ‘between realm’
relationships that, I contend, can provide insight into broad relation-
ships between academic and pecuniary science that accompany uni-
versity research commercialization. Bold faced coefficients are
significant at the p < 0.05 level. Table 1 suggests that measures of
public and private science volume and impact are positively and sig-
nificantly related. These very correlations, however, highlight the
methodological challenge inherent in untangling environmental effects
from direct relationships.
A methodological challenge
Efforts to capture environmental effects must take multiple indicators
into account and regression methods face important limitations in di-
rectly estimating reciprocal relationships among many variables. Thus,
attempts to capture trends and transitions in associations among public
and private science measures face significant challenges. A simple an-
swer, examine patterns of correlation among key variables, founders
when we take the high likelihood of spurious relationships introduced
by shared organizational causes or complex interrelationships among
indicators into account.
Recall Table l. Note the strong and significant (r ¼ 0.588) correlation
between patent volume and paper volume. This correlation may be
misleading to the extent that both patents and papers are positively
related to a third factor. If, for instance, high levels of industrial R&D
support increase research capacity and thus accelerate both patenting
and publishing on campus, the correlation reported in Table l will over-
estimate the actual relationship between the two variables. Economic
TRENDS AND TRANSITIONS IN THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 99
research examining complementary relationships among clusters of
organizational strategies, however, offers a potential solution to this
dilemma; regress variables of interest on each other and on relevant
organizational controls and then examine patterns of correlation among
the residuals (Arora 1996; Arora and Gambardella 1990; Athey and
Stern 1998).
A strategy emphasizing residual correlations examines the compo-
nents of an association that cannot be explained by appeal to available
variables.12 Broadly, regression analyses explain some portion of ob-
served variance in a dependent variable as a function of variation in a
set of independent variables. The difference between observed values of
the dependent variable and those predicted by a given model is the
residual. Generally attributed to error, the residual term in a regression
results from variation that cannot be explained by the model. Corre-
lating residuals, then, can offer insights into environmental relationships
because such correlations capture covariance net of what can be ex-
plained statistically.
Speaking metaphorically, correlating the residuals of regressions
estimated on multiple dependent variables for a large group of orga-
nizations is akin to checking the weather. Removing variance attribut-
able to research-intensive universities offers a glimpse of environmental
features that are not directly attributable to observable features of
campuses. Establishing residual correlations among the variables de-
scribed in Table 1 requires estimation of four multiple regression
equations (one for each variable). Each model includes the three
remaining focal variables and a set of control measures highlighted in
Table 2. Estimating such equations for the full time panel (1981–1995),
extracting and correlating the residuals offers a static sense of the
institutional environment for university science aggregated across the
entire fifteen year period.
Table 3 reprises the direct correlations reported in Table 1 and also
reports residual correlations for the same variables. Once again, the
relationships of interest are outlined. Where direct correlations suggest
positive and significant associations among all four measures of public
and private science outputs, residual correlations tell a very different
story. In the aggregate, relationships among these variables net of
explicable variance suggest that public and private science efforts may
be at odds. Patent volume is negatively and significantly associated with
publication volume and increasing patent impact is also negatively
correlated with the production of basic articles in science and engi-
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of commercial endeavors. On balance, then, Table 3 suggests that uni-
versities who patent extensively may face challenges in maintaining the
volume of their basic science. These results, however, may mask
important temporal variation.
Observing trends and transitions
The meat of this paper is change, but of a particular type. Attending to
the durability and legitimacy of multiple overlapping institutional sys-
tems requires that attention be paid to initial conditions and to the
obduracy of existing arrangements (Clemens and Cook 1999; Zucker
1977). In this sense, analyses of institutional dynamics must be sensitive
to an evolutionary and history-dependent sense of change as movement
from established starting points (Nelson and Winter 1982). At the same
time, observations that profound institutional transformations are
dramatically periodized (Scott et al. 2000) imply the necessity of
determining when and how sets of relationships differ from those that
preceded them. In the sections that follow, I examine residual correla-
tions among public and private science outcomes for thirteen three-year
(moving) pooled cross-sections.13 This method offers a ‘smoothed’ view
of change without, it should be noted, indicating when a given associ-
ation differs significantly from its prior value. Plotting residual rela-
tionships along a temporal axis defined by time periods offers an
impressionistic view of shifting patterns of convergence and divergence
across basic and proprietary science.
Figure 1 plots four associations by time period to document trends in
the relationship between public and private science. These relationships
are outlined in the correlation matrices presented in Tables l and 3. The
x-axis in Figure 1 represents a zero correlation. Associations greater
than zero suggest convergence, those less than zero suggest substitution.
Correlations are plotted as z-scores to enable comparison across rela-
tionships.
Consider the solid black line in Figure 1, which tracks the relation-
ship between patent and publication volume. This trend captures one of
the simplest possible relationships between public and private science
regimes. If increases in patenting are corrosive to an academic science
system that emphasizes prompt publication of findings, then this line
will tend toward the negative. In contrast, if the same mechanisms
support high capacity in both article and IP outputs, then this rela-
tionship will manifest a positive tendency. Over time the trend is one of
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independence or moderate complementarity until the early 1990s which
see the beginnings of a steep downturn (z ¼ 0.009 in the 1989–1991
period and z ¼ )0.528 in the 1993–1995 period). In the terms I have
been using, the period beginning in approximately 1990 is characterized
by an increasingly negative environmental relationship between patent
volume and publication rates.
An opposite trend is clear in the residual association between patent
and publication impact – the dashed black line in Figure 1. From soon
after the passage of Bayh–Dole until the mid 1980s, high impact pub-
lications and high impact patents appear relatively independent. In later
time periods, however, a clear upward trend is discernable (z ¼ 0.108 in
1987–1989, z ¼ 0.380 in 1993–1995). Where volume measures of public
and private science diverge in the early 1990s, high impact patents and
publications converge reflecting an institutional environment charac-
terized by accumulative advantage (Merton 1968) across highly cited
publications and patents. The net implication of these two trends is that
universities engaged in high volume but indiscriminate patenting may
see declines in publications, but those with the experience and compe-
tencies to pursue high impact patents may be able to parlay their success
across academic and commercial efforts.
Two further pairs of associations link volume measures in one realm
with the impact indicators of the other. The solid gray line captures the
Figure 1. Trends in residual correlations, by three year moving periods.
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relationship between extensive patenting and the fecundity of academic
publications while the dashed gray line reflects the association between
article volume and the future impact of intellectual property. These
trends, too, follow distinctively different patterns that suggest dangers
linked to the indiscriminate pursuit of patents. Both trends remain
mildly negative through the 1980s but they begin to diverge early in the
1990s with the relationship between patenting and publication impact
tending in a more negative direction starting in the early 1990s. In
contrast, the association between high impact IP and article volume
shifts toward complementarity.
Figure 1 suggests that the institutional environment of public and
private science bifurcates in the early 1990s. High volume patenting
comes to be associated with decreases in the volume and fecundity of
publications while high impact IP is linked to increases in the volume
and impact of basic science outputs. For universities that patent
extensively but indiscriminately a storm may be brewing. In contrast
high impact patenting offers a path to leverage resources and compe-
tencies across academic and commercial endeavors. Generally, rela-
tionships between public and private science have shifted to benefit
organizations with the capacity to produce, identify, and prosecute high
impact innovations. In the 1990s such organizations encounter an
environment where public science advantage may stem, in part, from
effectively picking one’s shots in the commercial realm. While these
trends illumine possible outcomes of commercialization, they offer little
purchase on the ‘sticky’ dynamics of institutional change. Thus, I turn
from a focus on trends to analysis of transitions in the same set of
associations.
Tracking transitions
Two classes of significance tests are necessary to establish substantively
meaningful transitions in an institutional environment. The first, and
more common, test determines whether a given association differs from
zero. For rhetorical purposes, I dub this variety of significance test a
‘cross-sectional comparison’. The benefits of a cross-sectional approach
lie in its simplicity and ready interpretability. Here a statistically
important shift in a relationship occurs when coefficients move from
significance to independence, gain significance, or flip sign. While
intuitive, cross-sectional approaches do some violence to a theoretical
conception of change that emphasizes durability and the stickiness of
initial conditions.
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A more conceptually satisfying approach tests differences in the same
relationships across time periods. This strategy, which I call a ‘longi-
tudinal comparison, fits more closely with the theoretical sensibility
underlying sociological approaches to institutional change. Longitudi-
nal assessments of significance require that correlation coefficients
(r-scores) be transformed into z-scores, which approximate a standard
normal distribution and enable statistical tests using a variant of the
standard z-test. Residual associations differ significantly from those that
preceded them if a two-tailed z-test fails to support the null hypothesis,
H0:z
0
rl ¼ z0r2, at the p < 0.05 level. I implemented longitudinal tests
iteratively beginning by comparing period 1 and period 2 associations.
If that test failed to reject the null hypothesis period 1 was compared to
period 3. The process proceeded across time periods until (and if ) a
significant change was uncovered. The time period that witnessed such a
change became the new baseline for comparison allowing me to induce
patterns of transition.
Shifts away from an initial level of association might be of two kinds.
Quantitative transitions are longitudinally significant changes in mag-
nitude without associated shifts in sign or significance. Qualitative
transitions, in contrast, are longitudinally significant changes accom-
panied by cross-sectional shifts in sign or significance. Combining lon-
gitudinal and cross-sectional significance tests in this fashion enables
analysis of when transitions occur and what kinds of changes they
represent. Table 4 presents the results of these analyses for the residual
correlations linking public and private science outcomes.
Table 4 highlights significant transition periods in the trends pre-
sented in Figure 1. A light gray ‘S’ represents a negative or substitution
relationship, a dark gray ‘C’ indicates a positive or complementary
association, and a white ‘N’ reflects a non-significant or independent
correlation. Changes in color from one time period to another indicate
qualitative shifts. Periods that witness quantitative transitions are out-
lined and signs indicate direction. When longitudinal significance tests
fail to reject the null hypotheses of equality across periods, I take an
association to remain the same as its baseline. To get a sense of tran-
sitions in a given relationship, pick a column and read down.
Table 4 offers an important corrective to the trends presented in
Figure 1 by highlighting periodized transitions. All four ‘cross-realm’
relationships see significant qualitative shifts between 1981 and 1985.
Consider two key residual associations linking patent and publication
volume (column 1) and the impact of articles and IP (column 4). The
former begins as a complementary relationship and remains so until the
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early 1990s when it shifts to substitution. As the trend line suggested,
the early 1990s represent a watershed for the association between patent
and publication volume. Approximately a decade after Bayh-Dole, a
basic relationship between public and private science shifted from being
conducive to the simultaneous pursuit of patents and publications, to
linking academic tradeoffs to extensive patenting.14 While the envi-
ronment was changing to the potential detriment of universities whose
commercial endeavors were based on high volume patenting, the judi-
cious pursuit of high impact intellectual properties came, by the final
time period, to be positively related to both publication volume and
impact.
Table 4 also suggests that some time periods are particularly
important transition points. The first period provides a starting point









P1:81–83 C C C N
P2:82–84 C C C N
P3:83–85 C C S N
P4:84–86 C C S N
P5:85–87 C S S N
P6:86–88 C S S N
P7:87–89 C S S N
P8:88–90 C S S N
P9:89–91 C S S N
P 10:90–92 S S N C
P11:91–93 S S N C
P12:92–94 S+ S N C
P13:93–95 S+ S C C
Color changes represent qualitative transitions.
Outlined cells represent quantitative transitions.
S: Substitution relationship.
S+: Substitution relationship strengthened by significant (p < 0.05) quantitative
change. C: Complementary relationship.
N: No relationship, independent.
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and four other periods (1983–1985, 1985–1987, 1990–1992, & 1993–
1995) witnessed qualitative shifts in public and private science rela-
tionships. If residual correlations capture important features of the
universities’ institutional environment, then these time periods are
watersheds for understanding academic research commercialization.
To get a sense of the patterned associations that characterize a time
period, pick a row and read across. The first row of Table 4 captures the
initial ‘field of play’ in the years immediately subsequent to Bayh–Dole.
In the early 1980s commercially engaged universities encountered a
forgiving institutional environment where points of contact between
public and private science were largely positive, suggesting the possi-
bility of positive feedback across academic and commercial activities.
Such reciprocal loops provide multiple benefits to first mover universi-
ties by facilitating the transfer of skills and capacities from one scientific
production regime to another without linking commercial impact to
that transfer. In simpler terms, the few years immediately following
Bayh–Dole (and perhaps those that preceded it) encompass an envi-
ronment highly conducive to organizational learning about a new
institutional arena.
Whether it resulted from the efforts of incumbent universities, other
research organizations, or forces exogenous to the academic R&D
system, a transition occurs in the 1983–1985 period.15 This cross-section
differs from the preceding one primarily in that pursuing high impact
patents comes at the potential expense of publication. Here, the envi-
ronment still appears conducive to learning but may primarily reward
high volume efforts that enable universities to develop locally appro-
priate arrangements for identifying and prosecuting patents rather than
more focused efforts to evaluate quality. Further changes chipped away
at an initial environment supportive of experimentation with commer-
cial outputs. The 1985–1987 time period witnessed a transition in the
relationship between patent volume and the impact of scientific papers.
By the 1990–1992 period, the ‘forgiving’ environment that characterized
the years immediately following Bayh–Dole had all but completely
eroded as high volume patenting also became associated with decreases
in publication volume and impact. This time period also saw a shift in
the role played by high impact intellectual property. Where patenting
extensively was negatively related to publishing efforts, Patenting judi-
ciously with an eye toward impact came to be positively associated with
high quality scientific publications.
By the final time period, the environment for public and private
science had almost completely reversed its valence. Quantitative
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transitions deepened the negative association between patent and pub-
lication volume and a qualitative shift in the relationship between patent
impact and publication volume formed the final link to create a new
environment where the possibility for advantage to cumulate across
public and private science depends upon organizational capacities to
produce, identify, and prosecute high impact innovations. In the
broadest possible strokes, the epochal view of change offered by this
reading of Table 4 suggests an institutional environment where public
and private science interfaces transition – in fits and starts – from a
‘pressure system’ characterized by positive returns based in output
volume to one characterized by complementary association at the level
of impacts.
Discussion and implications
In more practical terms, Table 4 paints an interesting picture of inter-
university competition as it suggests strong and continuing sources of
advantage for campuses that made early and substantial moves to
commercialize research through patenting. Initial patterns of associa-
tion suggest that universities which began patenting at or before the
passage of Bayh–Dole faced an environment that was particularly
conducive to experimentation and learning. In a context where high
volume patenting efforts were positively associated with academic
endeavors, universities that patented extensively faced little academic
penalty for pursuing the very activities that would allow them to de-
velop the organizational capacities necessary to consistently leverage
commercial efforts into academic returns.
Initial conditions then, may have tipped the playing field in favor of
incumbents as these early entrants were able to develop the competen-
cies and capacities necessary to allow them to shift focus to more
effectively concentrate on high impact intellectual properties in later
time periods. The lasting effects of an early pattern of accumulative
advantage based on patent volume might be further accelerated by a
later regime that linked continuing academic returns only to high im-
pact commercial science. This further shift may have especially benefited
those incumbent universities who most effectively learned to separate
commercial wheat from chaff and the net effect of this pattern of
environmental change may have been to generate a stratification order
characterized by first-mover advantage that deepened with transitions in
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the channels for increasing returns across public and proprietary
endeavors.
Such an interpretation, however, depends intimately upon the sour-
ces of the institutional transitions I trace. While establishing those
sources lies well beyond the scope of this paper, descriptive data can
provide some initial insights. Consider two possible sources that both
postulate universities as the driving force behind their changing envi-
ronment. Transformations in an institutional field may result from
organizational entry.16 Research-intensive universities entered the pat-
enting game in multiple waves. If academic institutions themselves are
the driving organizational force behind the changes I document here,
and if such shifts result from the actions of organizational entrants, then
the transitions highlighted in Table 4 should be traceable to the efforts
of newcomers. New players may carry novel strategies for managing the
tensions that arise from collapsing public and private science into a
single mission. Such entrants would also, presumably, benefit from the
convergence between their environment and competencies that is a
correlate of an entry-based theory of change.
Alternately, institutional change may come about as a result of
adaptation and mimicry. A small group of universities that established
successful technology transfer programs well before the passage of
Bayh–Dole may have defined the rules of the game for all the organi-
zations that followed. On this view, new entrants – especially those that
lack the competencies and resources necessary for innovation – will
largely mimic the arrangements of their established counterparts. Such
mimicry need not be founded on the success of standard arrangements
(Dimaggio and Powell 1983). Rather than effecting change in their
environments, new waves of entrants would only serve to reify old sets
of rules.
The lesson of this paper is that the rules of the academic game have
not remained stable. If entrants increase institutional durability, and if
universities are a key source of changes to their environments, then such
changes are likely to emerge from organizational adaptation and
innovation by the (relatively) expert and resource rich incumbents who
dominate academic technology transfer efforts. Under this logic, the
transitions documented in Table 4 should be foreshadowed by intra-
organizational transformations among the incumbents. Here, initial
entrants will continually shift the conditions of the game by adapting
their efforts and innovating under conditions of organizational slack.
Such a pattern of change will progressively cement their advantage,
offering support for an interpretation of institutional change in public
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and private science that results in a stable stratification order charac-
terized by increasing disparities.
If we define entry as the founding of formal infrastructure for tech-
nology transfer then universities did enter the commercial game in
waves. Examining the success of incumbents, early, and later entrants
may provide insights into the sources of institutional change and thus
their practical implications. Table 5 presents descriptive statistics on
four focal variables for three sub-samples of universities: (1) incumbents
who entered prior to Bayh–Dole; (2) institutions that entered in the
1980s; (3) those that did not develop technology transfer capacity until
after 1990.
A quick glance at the two measures of commercial science suggests
significant disparities between incumbents and the two waves of en-
trants. Early entrants received almost 23 patents a year on average with
less dispersion in patent impact than did either wave of newcomers. In
addition incumbents appear to publish more and higher impact articles
than do entrants. Two sample t-tests bear out these impressions.
Incumbent universities are more prolific patentors and publishers than
either entrant wave. Their academic outputs are also higher impact on
average. Likewise, 1980s era entrants patent and publish significantly
more than those who entered post-1990. In terms of patent volume,
then, it appears that incumbents have a real and lasting advantage over
both groups of entrants. T-tests support a similar pattern for both
measures of academic science, but not for patent impact where there are
no significant differences across classes of institutions. It is possible, that
the lasting benefits of incumbency might depend on early success as well
as early entry.
Table 5 provides mixed but suggestive support for a model of insti-
tutional change that depends on the actions of established players.
Given the wide variation apparent even among incumbent universities,
however, more fine-grained distinctions might be necessary to sub-
stantiate an adaptation-based argument and to distinguish its effects
from those generated exogenously. Regardless, the strict ordering of
both patent and publication volume by entry date militates against
entrants as the source of transformation. Nevertheless, universities are
not sole players in either science or commerce. Federal and state
agencies, large and small firms from multiple sectors, and increasingly
powerful professional associations may also affect the environment
faced by entrepreneurial universities. In an extreme case, the changes
documented here may be entirely exogenous to university activities.
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weather by making the success or failure of individual organizations
contingent on their ability to adapt to prevailing conditions that are
neither of their own making nor subject to their control. The institu-
tional environment for public and private science is changing in a
dramatic fashion that may have serious ramifications both for individ-
ual institutions and for the characteristic organizational arrangements
and activities of academe. Untangling the implications of institutional
change, however, requires further research to determine its sources.
Acknowledgements
This research was supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF
Grant 0097970). This paper benefited from the thoughtful comments of
Wayne Baker, Jerry Davis, John Meyer, Woody Powell, Nate Rosen-
berg, three anonymous reviewers for the Journal of Higher Education,
and the participants at the OBHRM brown bag at the University of
Michigan Business School, the SCANCOR conference on Universities
and the Production of Knowledge at Stanford University, and Institu-
tions, Conflict and Change 4 (ICC4) at Northwestern University. Any
remaining mistakes are, of course, my own.
Notes
1. The actual effects of Bayh–Dole are controversial, but commentators agree that
while the act did not create university commercialization it expanded and accel-
erated the trend toward academic engagement with commerce (Mowery et al.
2001).
2. The earliest example is the University of Wisconsin, which founded the non-profit
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) to commercialize faculty
inventions in 1925.
3. Studies of university technology transfer range from interpretive analyses of mat-
ched patents and publications (Myers 1995) and of case law (McSherry 2001) to
econometric analyses of the total factor productivity of academic licensing efforts
(Thursby and Thursby 2002) and bibliometric examinations of the shifting com-
position of national R&D efforts (Hicks et al. 2001).
4. But note that more subtle second order effects of research commercialization may
have yet to manifest themselves and recent legal challenges to academic research
exemptions (Eisenberg 2003) may remove an important (though never truly for-
malized) veil protecting universities from some negative implications of their own
turn toward intellectual property protection.
5. The most coherent description of profound institutional change to date can be
found in Scott and colleagues’ (Scott et al. 2000) analysis of healthcare
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organizations in California, which argues that such changes result in the relatively
rapid rise of new actors, logics, meanings, relationships and conceptions of an
organizational field. My emphasis on the characteristic outputs of two durable
institutional systems emphasizes logics, meanings, and relationships over new
organizational or collective efforts.
6. Note that I define academic and commercial ‘uses’ primarily in terms of funding
sources and dissemination mechanisms rather than by the type of organization
producing the findings. On this view a finding supported by NIH funding and
published in a peer reviewed journal represents ‘basic science’ whether the research
was conducted in corporate, academic, government, or non-profit research
environments.
7. This logic underpinned early public university entrants’ tendency to administer
patenting and licensing arrangements off campus through separate non-profit
organizations. The most notable example of this approach is WARF.
8. Such analyses typically draw on some combination of patent, publication, funding,
and reputational data (Agrawal and Henderson 2002; Owen-Smith 2003; Sine et al.
2003).
9. Research One is a designation of research intensity that was applied to academic
institutions by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. In order to qualify
for Research One status an institution had to grant at least 50 doctorates and
receive more than $40 million of federal R&D funding annually. The Carnegie
classification system was recently changed but prior to the transition 89 US uni-
versities qualified as Research One institutions. Missing data on academic outputs
prevents the inclusion of two universities (Howard University and Yeshiva Uni-
versity) in these analyses.
10. Patents are time stamped by their application date rather than their issue date to
avoid complications introduced by variable lags in the patent examination process
(Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2002).
11. Because the University of California system, like many multi-system campuses,
administers patents from a central location, patents were assigned to individual
campuses by appeal to the address of the first inventor. It was not possible using
this technique to distinguish between UC-Berkeley and UCSF, so the campuses
were combined.
12. This approach is uncommon in quantitative sociology with the exception of large
scale statistical studies of inequality where residuals in exceptionally well specified
models are often attributed to the unobservable effects of discrimination (England
1992).
13. Where the matrices reported in Table 2 represent relationships across an entire
fifteen year pool and hence assume there are no significant changes across time
periods, independently estimating residual correlations in three year moving win-
dows documents trends while maintaining a reasonable sample size (N ¼ 261
University-years) in each pool. I define the time periods starting in 1981 (the year
immediately following the passage of Bayh–Dole as follows: Period 1: 1981–1983,
Period 2: 1982–1984 … Period 13: 1993–1995. For each time period I estimate four
OLS regressions on the focal variables defined in Table 1. Each model includes the
controls defined in Table 2 and the remaining focal variables. The result is a set of
13 residual correlation matrices that can be ‘stacked’ to represent system level
trends in public and private science relationships.
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14. Quantitative shifts strengthening this relationship occurred in the mid-1990s sug-
gesting that the negative association between indiscriminate patenting and article
publication is becoming stronger.
15. Residual correlations derived from regressions, which control for all inter-university
variation (using university fixed effects) manifest almost complete independence
among measures and no discernable trends in residual correlations, suggesting that
the changes observed here are a result of unobserved variation across universities. It
is possible, then, that the changing environment described here is altered primarily
by the actions of academic institutions as they enter the commercial arena and
pursue pecuniary science outcomes. Results of these models are available from the
author upon request.
16. In principle, such changes could also be a result of failure or exit. Large universities,
however, rarely fail or merge and, as yet, few have withdrawn entirely from com-
mercial endeavors. Thus, I do not consider this possibility.
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